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SECURITY INFORMATION

29 June 1953

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director
Psychological Strategy Board

SUBJECT : Comments on "Sputnik" Current Tension for Implementation
of the Strategic Concept" (PSB D-40)

1. CIA staff review of the PSB study distributed to members of the WGS has elicited the following additional comments:

a. Responding to Orbit "peace deals." There is a general feeling that the Communist peace offensive could successfully be labeled a sham in view of Russian repressive tactics in East Germany. One commentator recommended a resolution in the UN which (1) takes note of the unrest in the eastern European Satellites, (2) condemns the repressive measures taken against the workers, (3) emphasizes that, contrary to Communist claims, the workers' paradise does not even exist, and (4) takes note of the findings of the report made by the UN slave labor committee to ECOSOC in Geneva on 23 June 1953. Another recommendation was that timely comments attributed to the White House and/or the State Department be issued as a means of exposing the peace offensive and regaining the initiative. Another recommendation for putting peace deals in perspective and regaining the initiative is that Bernada offers the natural occasion for handling both situations since the decisions taken there will be in a sense the response to the "peace deals", while the world-wide publicity the meeting will receive will offer the opportunity for maximum exploitation of the decisions made by the participants. Assuming that a Big Four Conference will be decided upon at Bernada it becomes necessary for the published results of the Conference to reflect the feeling that the orbit, by showing a certain amount of "sincerity", has given the western world evidence that a high-level conference can do much towards advancing the cause for peace. Thus, the results of the Conference could be construed as an attempt by the western powers to avoid seeming to grudge or belittle any tangible step towards civilized relations. At the same time the western powers could release a statement of principles by which the western powers would make known the basic principles which would govern them in any negotiations. Here the emphasis should be upon those basic principles which have traditionally served to guide the action of christian civilization and they should be presented in such a manner as to leave unmistakably clear the determination of the western powers to act only on

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such principles in their dealings with the Soviet bloc. The author of this recommendation feels that it should be clear that the western nations do not reject the "liberation" policy and it should be the aim of this declaration of principles to assure the peoples under Soviet influence that their cause has not been abandoned by governments more interested in a temporary peace than in the lives of subjected individuals. The author of the recommendation also urges that the United States issue the statement unilaterally if the other governments do not agree. Other recommendations for action in this category include pressing the following themes: 1) that the USSR stop using the Soviet military to enforce slave labor policies in the USSR and satellite countries, 2) that the USSR allow free elections, with UN observers present, in the satellite countries, 3) that the Soviet Union give more freedom to Soviet-controlled workers in the free world, and 4) that representatives of the International Communist Party in the free world stop preaching for world revolution and drumming up hate against economic systems other than their own.

b. Combating Cleavages. One commentator is of the opinion that the foreign state of mind has been caused by true newspaper articles prepared by AP, UP and other news reports emanating directly from the United States. If the present Administration would take forceful positive actions which would be reflected in press reports throughout the world, then follow up these actions with positive overt and covert propaganda, such resentments and doubts would soon disappear. The suggestion has also been made that we may combat the foreign state of mind about U.S. foreign trade policies by emphasizing our current actions along the line of Administration announcements for "Trade Not Aid." A New York Times article of June 21 on this subject is attached.

c. Promoting Communist Disunity and regaining the Initiative. Several methods of promoting communist disunity and regaining the initiative has been proposed. They are: 1) renewed speculation on the current fate of Malenkov in the Soviet hierarchy, 2) contrasting of our proposal to send wheat to Pakistan with the lack of assistance China is receiving from her supposed ally, Russia, in combatting the alarming famine that is sweeping the country, 3) exploitation of the radical changes in the politbureau since the death of Stalin as indications of uneasiness and lack of security, and 4) exploitation of the East Germany and Czech situation and Polish air force defections. It is also suggested by one commentator that "carrot and stick" be forgotten and that Soviet vulnerability to determined action be emphasized, indicated by use of tanks and Russian troops against Berliners. The suggestion has also been made that full use of

-2-

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over propaganda media be made. Possible proposals to this end might be 1) insistence on free elections in Germany, 2) a suggestion of exchange of students between this country and Soviet dominated countries, 3) demand agreement on international inspection and control of strategic armaments and atomic weapons, and 4) stress importance to world peace and the relations of war prisoners still held captive by the Soviets.

"SIGNED"

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Attachment: 1
New York Times Article

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